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RECENT DECISIONS
which a reasonable man would infer possible danger. This interpre-
tation of last clear chance is but one step from the majority view-
that if an ordinary prudent man would have discovered the danger,
regardless of the facts actually known, there is sufficient knowledge
to satisfy the requirements of the doctrine. It would seem that the
ultimate result of the present trend will be the application, in those
cases otherwise within the scope of the doctrine, of a purely objective
test of knowledge.
Some will argue that further extensions of the doctrine of last
clear chance will culminate in completely obviating the defense of
contributory negligence. 22 However, if the doctrine is viewed as a
facet of the theory of proximate causation, it automatically limits it-
self to situations in which the negligence of the plaintiff can be said
to be remote.2 3 It is submitted that the more liberal application of
the last clear chance doctrine in New York reflects a more humane
attitude on the part of the courts which is wholly consistent with the
present trend toward "plaintiff-mindedness." The courts are obvi-
ously attempting to ameliorate the harshness of the defense of con-
tributory negligence by extending the application of the doctrine of
last clear chance. This would be rendered to a great degree unneces-
sary if the doctrine of comparative negligence, which is in itself an
ameliorating doctrine,24 were adopted in this jurisdiction. 25
WILLs-REvocATIoN BY AFTER-BORN CHILD-INSURANCE POL-
IcY "SETTLEMENT" WITHIN MEANING OF STATUTE.-Pursuant to
Section 26 of the Decedent Estate Law, plaintiff sought, as an after-
born child, to recover her intestate share from her father's estate.
Prior to her birth, plaintiff's father executed a will, establishing a
trust for her mother and sister but making no mention of, or pro-
vision for, plaintiff. Subsequently, he made plaintiff co-beneficiary
of several insurance policies. On appeal, the Court held that the
testator's designation of plaintiff as co-beneficiary of the insurance
policies was a settlement under Section 26, precluding her from tak-
ing her intestate share as against her father's will. Matter of Faber,
305 N. Y. 200, 111 N. E. 2d 883 (1953).
At English common law, a will was presumably revoked by a
subsequent marriage and birth of issue.1  However, mere birth of
issue alone, where a marriage existed at the time of the execution of
22 See Panarese v. Union Ry., 261 N. Y. 233, 238, 185 N. E. 84, 86 (1933).
23 Rider v. Syracuse Rapid Transit Ry., 171 N. Y. 139, 63 N. E. 836
(1902) ; Nehring v. Connecticut Co., 86 Conn. 109, 84 Atl. 301 (1912).24 See Steam Dredge No. 1, 134 Fed. 161, 168 (1st Cir. 1904).
25 See Note, 27 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 303 (1953).
2 For a discussion of the common law, see Brush v. Wilkins, 4 Johns.
Ch. 506, 510-16 (N. Y. 1820).
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the will, never gave rise to the presumption.2 This rule was adopted
by the New York courts 3 and later enacted into law.I The civil law,
on the other hand, followed a different rule, resting upon the pre-
sumed oversight of the parent, whereby the failure to mention or
provide for a child worked a nullification of the will.5 It was this
principle of the civil law which the legislature engrafted upon our
law in modified form 1 so as to provide for partial revocation to the
extent of the after-born child's intestate share.7 Since the main pur-
pose of the statute was to prevent an oversight and not to regulate
distribution,8 certain acts indicating that the after-born children were
not overlooked place the will beyond the operation of the statute.9
These acts may consist either of mention or provision for the chil-
dren in the will or provision for them by any settlement dehors the
will. 10 What constitutes "any settlement" as stated in the statute
was the problem before the court in the instant case.
The courts' interpretation of the alternative requirements of
"mention or provision in the will" are of great assistance in constru-
ing what is required by "any settlement." "I If the will indicates that
the parent had executed it with the possibility of after-born children
in mind, the statute is satisfied.12 Mention may be specific, general 13
or in the form of a general provision.1 4  Moreover, the provision
need not be vested,15 certain,16 or adequate. 17 The courts do not
look to the adequacy or to the certainty of the provision but to the
testator's intent-was the disinheritance deliberate or inadvertent.' 8
2 Ibid.
3 Brush v. Wilkins, supra note 1.
42 N. Y. Rav. STAT. pt. 2. c. 6, tit. 1, art. 3, § 43 (1829).
5 See note 1 supra; Wormser v. Croce, 120 App. Div. 287, 289, 104 N. Y.
Supp. 1090, 1091 (1st Dep't 1907) ; Matter of Kraston, 58 N. Y. S. 2d 364.
366 (Surr. Ct. 1945) ; 1 DAVIDS, Nzw YORK LAW OF WILLS § 547 (1923).
6 See McLean v. McLean, 207 N. Y. 365, 371, 101 N. E. 178, 179 (1913);
Wormser v. Croce, supra note 5.
7 N. Y. DEc. EsT. LAW § 26.
8 See McLean v. McLean, supra note 6 at 371-372, 101 N. E. at 179;
Matter of Griffin, 159 Misc. 12, 15, 287 N. Y. Supp. 514, 517 (Surr. Ct. 1936).
9 Ibid.
10 See note 7 supra.
11 See McLean v. McLean, 207 N. Y. 365, 373, 101 N. E. 178, 180 (1913);
Matter of Froeb, 143 Misc. 660, 663, 257 N. Y. Supp. 851, 855 (Surr. Ct.
1931).
12 Matter of Dawson, 192 Misc. 783, 82 N. Y. S. 2d 453 (Surr. Ct. 1948);
Matter of Callister, 147 Misc. 257, 263 N. Y. Supp. 536 (Surr. Ct. 1933)
Matter of Dick, 117 Misc. 635, 191 N. Y. Supp. 762 (Surr. Ct. 1922).
13 Holbrook v. Holbrook, 193 App. Div. 286, 183 N. Y. Supp. 728 (2d
Dep't 1920), aff'd mer., 230 N. Y. 600, 130 N. E. 909 (1921); Wormser v.
Croce, 120 App. Div. 287, 104 N. Y. Supp. 1090 (1st Dep't 1907).
14 See McLean v. McLean, supra note 11 at 371, 101 N. E. at 179.
15 Matter of Shea, 94 N. Y. S. 2d 65 (Surr. Ct. 1949) ; Matter of Keech,
73 N. Y. S. 2d 231 (Surr. Ct. 1947).
16 McLean v. McLean, 207 N. Y. 365, 101 N. E. 178 (1913).
IT Id. at 373, 101 N. E. at 180.is Tavshanjian v. Abbott, 200 N. Y. 374, 93 N. E. 978 (1911).
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The same test was applied in interpreting the meaning of the
term "any settlement." 19 Since the statute did not specify any par-
ticular form, character or content for the settlement,20 the court turned
to the purpose of the statute for an explanation of the term. The
parent is presumed to intend to take care of those to whom he owes
an obligation, and the statute gives effect to this presumption by mak-
ing provision for the after-born child unintentionally forgotten by
his parent.21  If his actions indicate the omission was not uninten-
tional, the presumption is rebutted.2 2  Thus the courts reasoned that
settlement as used in this statute meant any act by which the testator
intends to provide for the child outside of the will.23
Intent of the testator is, therefore, the decisive criterion in de-
termining if a particular act is a settlement. 24 Consequently, the
courts have refused to limit the settlement to any particular character
or form: 25 insurance policies 26 and Totten trusts27 have been held
to meet the requirements of the statute. The settlement need not be
such as would be determined by the courts to be adequate,2 8 but the
adequacy of the settlement is evidentiary in determining the specific
intent of the testator.29 The settlement may be vested or contingent,30
19Matter of Froeb, 143 Misc. 660, 257 N. Y. Supp. 851 (Surr. Ct. 1931);
Matter of Brant, 121 Misc. 102, 201 N. Y. Supp. 60 (Surr. Ct. 1923).2 0 See Matter of Kraston, 58 N. Y. S. 2d 364, 365 (Surr. Ct. 1945);
Matter of Kreutz, 49 N. Y. S. 2d 402, 404 (Surr. Ct. 1944) ; Matter of Froeb,
supra note 19 at 663, 257 N. Y. Supp. at 855; Matter of Brant, supra note 19
at 104, 201 N. Y. Supp. at 61.21 See Matter of Griffin, 159 Misc. 12, 15, 287 N. Y. Supp. 514, 517-518
(Surr. Ct. 1936).
22 Ibid.
2 3 Matter of Curry, 21 N. Y. S. 2d 544 (Surr. Ct. 1940) ; Matter of Griffin,
supra note 21; Matter of Froeb, supra note 19; Matter of Brant, supra note 19.
24 See note 3 supra.
25 Matter of Kreutz, 49 N. Y. S. 2d 402 (Surr. Ct. 1944) (alternative
holding); Matter of Griffin, supra note 21; Matter of Froeb, 143 Misc. 660,
257 N. Y. Supp. 851 (Surr. Ct. 1931). Contra: Matter of Stem, 189 Misc.
639, 52 N. Y. S. 2d 631 (Surr. Ct. 1945) (settlement must be a written
document).
26 Matter of Schwabacher, 202 Misc. 15, 114 N. Y. S. 2d 157 (Surr. Ct.
1952); Matter of Stone, 200 Misc. 639, 107 N. Y. S. 2d 775 (Surr. Ct. 1951) ;
Matter of Kraston, 58 N. Y. S. 2d 364 (Surr. Ct. 1945); Matter of Kelly,
182 Misc. 481, 44 N. Y. S. 2d 438 (Surr. Ct. 1943) (alternative holding);
Matter of Hagendorn, 41 N. Y. S. 2d 491 (Surr. Ct. 1943).
27 Matter of Hartman, 55 N. Y. S. 2d 791 (Surr. Ct. 1945); Matter of
Curry, supra note 23.
28 Matter of Kraston, supra note 26; Matter of Kreutz, supra note 25;
Matter of Griffin, 159 Misc. 12, 287 N. Y. Supp. 514 (Surr. Ct. 1936) ; Matter
of Brant, 121 Misc. 102, 201 N. Y. Supp. 60 (Surr. Ct 1923).
29 In construing intent, the court will take into consideration such factors
as the nature and size of the provision, the value of the entire estate and its
relation to the settlement, the nature and amount of the provisions for other
children, and other acts and words of the testator. Matter of Griffin, supra
note 28 at 15, 287 N. Y. Supp. at 518.30 Matter of Schwabacher, supra note 26; Matter of Kirk, 191 Misc. 473,
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and it may be made before or after the execution of the will.31 It
must, however, be made by the testator.3 2
The court's stress on intent rather than form is the most rea-
sonable construction in view of the phraseology and purpose of the
statute. It accomplishes the desired result-repairing the effects of
an oversight, avoiding regulation of testamentary provisions, and
giving effect to parental intentions. A set form for the settlement
would not only tend to control a parent's testamentary distribution
of his property but also have a greater likelihood of frustrating the
execution of his real intentions.
X
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-ExcLUSIvE STATUTORY REMEDY
-RcOvERY FOR PARTIAL SILICOTIC DISABILITY DENIED.-Plaintiffs,
partially disabled by silicosis, sued defendant in negligence, charging
violation of the New York Labor Law.' The Court of Appeals
affirmed dismissal of the complaints and held that the plaintiffs were
barred from maintaining the actions by the provisions of the Work-
men's Compensation Law covering total silicotic disability,2 and that
such exclusive remedy 3 was not unconstitutional. Cifolo v. General
Electric Co., 305 N. Y. 209, 112 N. E. 2d 197 (1953).
The usual workmen's compensation act has as its objective the
protection of the employee against accidents 4 and illnesses arising
80 N. Y. S. 2d 378 (Surr. Ct. 1948).
31 See Matter of Stone, 200 Misc. 639, 107 N. Y. S. 2d 775 (Surr. Ct.
1951) ; Matter of Kraston, 58 N. Y. S. 2d 364 (Surr. Ct. 1945).
32 Matter of Bostwick, 78 Misc. 695, 140 N. Y. Supp. 588 (Surr. Ct. 1912).
'N. Y. LABOR LAW § 200 ("General duty to protect health and safety
of employees") ; § 299 (ventilation and removal of dust in factories where dust
producing machines are in use).
2N. Y. WORKMEN'S Comp. LAW §3(2). "Occupational diseases. Com-
pensation shall be payable for disabilities sustained or death incurred by an
employee resulting from the following occupational diseases:
"28. Silicosis or other dust diseases resulting in total disability or death."
3 Id. § 11. "The liability of an employer ... shall be exclusive and in place
of any other liability whatsoever, to such employee, his personal representa-
tives, husband, parents, dependents or next of kin, or anyone otherwise entitled
to recover damages, at common law or otherwise on account of such injury
or death. .. ."
SSee Goldberg v. 954 Marcy Corp., 276 N. Y 313 317, 12 N. E. 2d
311, 312 (1938) ; Choctaw County v. Bateman, 252 P. 2d 465, 467 (Okla. 1952).
"To constitute an accident within the Workmen's Compensation Act there must
be an untoward, unforeseen or unexpected event or series of events causing
injury." Matter of Carrie, 254 P. 2d 410, 411 (Idaho 1952).
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